Monday, August 24, 2026

A reckoning for OPG: Part 1

I previously posted this work as a single long substack piece 

Summary

Ontario Power Generation’s newly refurbished Darlington nuclear station is underperforming at a moment when the utility is asking ratepayers and government to support even larger nuclear commitments. With only one of four Darlington reactors operating this August, the situation raises questions about OPG’s operational reliability, rate-setting incentives, and broader role as Ontario’s publicly owned generator. This report argues that today’s concerns echo the conditions that led to the breakup of Ontario Hydro: escalating costs, weakening performance, opaque decision-making, and a public utility increasingly managed as a profit-seeking business rather than as a provider of power at cost. The immediate outage issue may prove explainable, but unless OPG is transparent about Darlington’s performance and the financial incentives embedded in its regulated rates, the political and public narrative around expensive, unreliable nuclear power could again become dangerous for Ontario’s electricity system. 




Key findings 

  • Darlington’s post-refurbishment performance is raising reliability concerns, with only one of four reactors operating during August despite the project’s recent completion.
  • OPG’s public communications have not adequately explained the recent outages, leaving room for speculation about whether they reflect technical problems, maintenance timing, financial incentives, or some combination of these factors.
  • The utility’s regulated rate structure may reward higher costs, lower production forecasts, and retained earnings growth, creating incentives that do not align neatly with ratepayer interests.
  • Current concerns echo the late Ontario Hydro period, when nuclear cost overruns, weakening performance, and governance choices damaged public and political confidence in the utility.
  • As OPG pursues small modular reactors, Pickering refurbishment, and possible new nuclear development, stronger transparency and accountability are needed before Ontario commits to further large-scale nuclear spending.

These findings point to a larger question than whether Darlington is simply having a bad month. The issue is whether Ontario’s publicly owned generator is still being governed, regulated, and explained to the public in a way that serves ratepayers first. That question begins with the immediate facts at Darlington, but it quickly leads back to the history Ontario has already lived through once: a nuclear-heavy public utility whose cost, performance, and institutional purpose became politically unsustainable.