This is the fifth, and final, post in a series inspired by a UKStudy that concluded a “truism” for natural gas in the coming
decades is ‘want wind, need gas.’”

I’ve previously noted the large proportion of baseload sources in
Ontario’s electricity generation.
Nuclear output, and the minimum output of hydroelectric generators,
totals about 72% of Ontario
consumption. Because Ontario has such a large
component of baseload supply, it likely ends up a good indicator of what is to
come for other jurisdictions. From the
UK study:
“Notwithstanding the other important findings and future implications for the UK of a growth in installed wind generation capacity, the important conclusion for gas is that until technological breakthroughs are made on demand side management, gas’ central role in providing buffering for variability in wind power generation is assured. In fact as installed wind capacity grows there is the danger that this ‘crowds out’ scope for less flexible generation technologies such as nuclear and possibly fossil fuels with carbon capture and sequestration, unless this is facilitated by ‘turn-down’ wind generation as accepted means of maintaining system stability”[ii]
That foresees for the UK what we already see in Ontario. Here we regularly see periods of excess supply where nuclear
units dump power, periods where water is run over falls instead of diverted
through turbines, and, almost nightly, we dump excess generation on adjacent
markets. We also now have the structure
for centralized wind forecasting (which we’ll pay for) in order to pay wind
generators as if we purchased output when they get ‘turned-down’ due to an
inability to accommodate more electricity on the grid. Costs specifically related to curtailing
production I’ve estimated will start to climb towards $800 million a year by
2017, - but that figure does not account for the costs associated with
maintaining capacity to meet demand when the wind is not blowing.
Texas is the US state with the largest Industrial Wind Turbine output,
which was, as expected, of little help to it in a hot dry summer. Prior to the summer, FERC (the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission), in its Summer 2011 Energy and Reliability Assessment, had indicated
Texas’ ERCOT had the smallest reserve margin (14%) of any system in the US, and cited
the average on-peak wind capacity at only 8.7% of nameplate (the capacity
value). When the heat failed to break in
Texas, market prices repeatedly hit the capped maximum of $3000/MWh while
mothballed coal plants were called back into service. The US Energy Information Administration
(EIA) would conclude (here) the underlying problem to be a shortage of
reserves, with a notable assist from a lack of interconnection with other power
grids. The lack of reserves is the issue
we’d expect with the addition of supply that does not meet peak demand, unless
another market mechanism is added.
The reason we’d expect a lack of reserve supply is because of adding the
intermittent source, wind, in situations where it doesn’t remove another source
– which is always when it has little capacity value at the expected peak demand
periods. If you have 100 units of supply
capacity and you’ve priced it based on it producing 50% of the time, adding
another 20 units will lower the price.
If those 20 units are absent at peak, you still need the 100 units but
they won’t run 50% of the time, so the cost of the plant, and infrastructure,
are spread out over fewer units of production.
This repeatedly comes as a surprise when wind supply is introduced
into new markets. Here’s the argument from Australia ( I’ve seen
it from Denmark and New York state too):
“While the levelised cost of energy from wind farms is higher than that of baseload coal and gas, the deployment of wind energy here and overseas is having a surprising impact on energy market prices: it is causing them to fall.”
This
relationship breaks down rather quickly if you need some reliable supply built. Lower prices are a market call for reduced
production capacity. The levelized cost
of unit energy (LUEC) is a nice concept, but a meaningless one without being
able to estimate, with some confidence, the capacity factor (CF) of a planned
project. The Ontario Power Authority,
for instance, cites the LUEC for CCGT plants at $65.1/MWh at a CF of 87%, but at a
30% CF they don’t quote the pricier CCGT plants, but conventional combustion turbines,
with the price rising to $123/MWh.[iii] The guaranteed purchase of wind output,
regardless of need or impact on other generators therefore increases the LUEC
of sources demoted to a support role.
Jurisdictions committed to functioning markets
for electricity are developing market mechanisms to deal with this
reality. In the USA, while ERCOT
struggled through record peak demands this summer, the PJM market area sailed
through it’s record demand without incident.
A New York Times blog entry helps to explain why; generators in the PJM
market “…also sell capacity: each utility
that serves customers has to go into the wholesale market and buy not only
energy but the actual availability of generation.” This is the flip side of devalued Watts during
the productive periods of intermittent generators – paying for the capacity to
generate Watts. It’s worth noting that,
at least in the Pennsylvania portion of PJM (the other letters were originally
for Jersey and Maryland), FITs are replaced by the market mechanisms of a renewable
portfolio standard (RPS). PJM appears to be an excellent study for proponents of electricity markets.
Germany
is catching on to this now to. Up
until now they dealt with increased renewable simply by not
taking any existing capacity offline, but recently some Germans are attempting
to find a market mechanism to encourage market construction of carbon-emitting
sources.[iv]
Ontario lacks the economic sophistication of the PJM market. In a rush to replace coal-fired generation with
wind, Ontario contracted the construction of CCGT natural gas
generation by providing guarantees in the form of ‘Net Revenue Requirements’ –
or NRR’s, at an average $7900/MWmonth.[v] This is the figure that is already hitting
electricity bills in Ontario, because we’ve already committed to these
contracts with the recent 4000MW of natural gas capacity. The CCGT plants constructed since 2007 run at
well under 30% capacity factors now, and that should decline through 2014,
before picking up slightly as nuclear capacity drops during refurbishments. The
reason for the NRR's is the ‘clean’ renewable strategy that seeks to not use the gas generation it required to have to meet demand.
Adding, for each MW of wind capacity, the NRR for it’s complimentary
natural gas backup, the calculation is that by 2019 this hidden cost of
the wind strategy will be adding about $660 million annually to bills in
Ontario. With this figure added onto our
modeling done before, we can go beyond the unrepresentative LUEC figure, which
is treated as the FIT rate of $135/MWh. That
is the price for taking everything regardless of the need for it, and for the
total cost we need to add the capacity payments, in this case the net revenue
requirements, for the CCGT complimentary supply. By factoring out, from the modeling work
communicated in previous posts, the unneeded generation that just creates
surplus, and the unneeded generation that prevents the utilization of our
existing hydro resources, I’ve calculated the amount of wind output that can be
utilized to meet demand in Ontario. Dividing what it costs us, by what we can use of the output, I've invented the term LUEV to describe the value of 1MW of wind production in Ontario (levelized unit energy value):
Year | Wind Generation (MWh) | Cost at $135/MWh | CCGT NRR for Wind BU | SBG MWh Attributed to Wind | Hydro Made Excess Due To Wind | Utilized Wind Output | Utilized as a % of all Generation | LUEV of Utilized Wind Output |
2006 | 444,445 | $60,000,075 | $0 | 574 | 0 | 443,871 | 99.87% | $135 |
2007 | 1,037,011 | $139,996,485 | $37,540,800 | 609 | 0 | 1,036,402 | 99.94% | $171 |
2008 | 1,460,529 | $197,171,415 | $44,745,600 | 7,186 | 0 | 1,453,343 | 99.51% | $166 |
2009 | 2,331,428 | $314,742,780 | $66,834,000 | 167,923 | 129,074 | 2,034,431 | 87.26% | $188 |
2010 | 2,809,569 | $379,291,815 | $102,858,000 | 272,829 | 134,370 | 2,402,370 | 85.51% | $201 |
2011 | 4,049,814 | $546,724,890 | $112,432,800 | 296,164 | 260,028 | 3,493,622 | 86.27% | $189 |
2012 | 6,239,063 | $842,273,505 | $175,948,800 | 899,518 | 859,192 | 4,480,353 | 71.81% | $227 |
2013 | 7,435,228 | $1,003,755,780 | $229,795,200 | 1,152,979 | 1,060,276 | 5,221,973 | 70.23% | $236 |
2014 | 10,275,872 | $1,387,242,720 | $273,877,200 | 2,117,177 | 1,839,811 | 6,318,884 | 61.49% | $263 |
2015 | 11,996,952 | $1,619,588,520 | $365,833,200 | 1,225,054 | 1,056,384 | 9,715,514 | 80.98% | $204 |
2016 | 14,253,886 | $1,924,274,610 | $437,881,200 | 1,914,090 | 1,507,570 | 10,832,226 | 75.99% | $218 |
2017 | 16,230,031 | $2,191,054,185 | $522,253,200 | 2,269,225 | 2,153,782 | 11,807,024 | 72.75% | $230 |
2018 | 18,022,431 | $2,433,028,185 | $594,396,000 | 3,004,050 | 2,912,978 | 12,105,403 | 67.17% | $250 |
2019 | 17,989,712 | $2,428,611,120 | $662,652,000 | 2,734,898 | 2,589,679 | 12,665,135 | 70.40% | $244 |
2020 | 18,493,145 | $2,496,574,575 | $662,652,000 | 3,124,767 | 2,667,785 | 12,700,593 | 68.68% | $249 |
2021 | 18,096,398 | $2,443,013,730 | $662,652,000 | 3,065,922 | 2,627,536 | 12,402,940 | 68.54% | $250 |
2022 | 17,781,071 | $2,400,444,585 | $662,652,000 | 2,481,469 | 2,011,299 | 13,288,303 | 74.73% | $231 |
168,946,585 | $22,807,788,975 | $5,615,004,000 | 24,734,434 | 21,809,764 | 122,402,387 | 72.45% | $232 |
The value of the wind output is dependent on the rest of the supply mix. Notably, wind is most expensive, and least utilized within Ontario, in 2014, which is the peak year for nuclear output in my model.
The UK study noted increasing wind generation carried the possibility, "that this ‘crowds out’ scope for less flexible generation technologies such as nuclear and possibly fossil fuels with carbon capture and sequestration." The study didn't note that this may be the singular rationale for a wind turbine strategy. Pages 40-41 of the anti-nuclear World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2010-211 argues nuclear is not compatible with renewables because "overcapacity kills efficiency incentives", and because "renewables need flexible complementary capacity:."
Wind seems to be a strikingly expensive proposition that doesn't to do anything aside from generating overcapacity at the expense of efficiency! It seems like the only thing it does do is make baseload generation, specifically nuclear, unprofitable - and it seems likely that is precisely the objective the pushers of wind have.
[i] Calculations per my model, ending in 2022 – assumes
no new builds of nuclear are operational prior to the removal of service of
Pickering’s 3000MW. Solar production not
in model.
[ii] Pages 77 and 78 of http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/NG-54.pdf
[iii]
Slide 39 of of this
IPSP supply presentation
[v] Page 15 of this RPP document